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ABSTRACT 
Purpose – The aim of this paper was to assess the causal relationship(s) between moral hazard 
and adverse selection of Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) construction projects. Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to explore the causes and effects relationships between moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects in Ghana. The study produced 
a framework to predict, estimate and depict the complex causal relationships (i.e. the 
directionality) between moral hazard and adverse selection. 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach – To test the proposed framework, a quantitative methodology 
was employed, in which, data were collected using research questionnaires that targeted a sample 
of two-hundred and eighty public-private-partnership (PPP) stakeholders in Ghana. A total of two 
hundred and ten useable questionnaires were retrieved representing a response rate of seventy-five 
percent. 
 
Findings – The interrelationships between the eight causes and nine effects of moral hazard and 
adverse selection were established using the model. The tested framework showed the degree of 
association and isolation of the unobserved variables on the indicator factors. Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) was used to evaluate the fit of items to latent constructs. Because the fit of each 
model was good and the item loadings were adequate, it was assumed that the indicators of the 
different variables factors were fitting. Furthermore, a diagnostic fit analysis was conducted using 
the robust maximum likelihood method to test the statistical significance of the parameter 
estimates. 
 
Originality/Value – The research findings will serve as a guide for construction stakeholders in 
the PPP sector on the causes and effects of adverse selection and moral hazard, and how to mitigate 
these. 
 
Practical Implications - This novel research is one of the few studies investigating the causal 
relationships between moral hazard and adverse selection of PPP construction projects. The 
research concluded with future studies that seek to validate the model developed in other countries 
and/ or other industries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An immediate challenge that faces Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) is the existence of 
informational asymmetries among the government (a principal) and the private firm (an agent) 
(Blanc-Brude, 2013). For this reason, information asymmetries must be factored during the design 
of any PPP contract (Ceric, 2011; De-Palma et al., 2009). Often and during the contract work, the 
agent is better informed than the principal on related ongoing activities and the actions of the 
private party that impact on these activities (Blanc-Brude, 2013). For example, the principal cannot 
observe or substantiate if the firm applies maximum effort required in the construction process 
(Loben, 2009). A moral hazard problem arises when the agent’s action is not verifiable, or when 
the agent receives private information after the partnership has been commenced. Moral hazard 
should not pose a challenge or problem if both the principal and agent had the same objective 
functions. However, the misunderstanding about which action should be taken is the basis for 
agency costs (Loben, 2009; Blanc-Brude, 2013).   
 
An adverse selection problem happens when the agent holds private information before the 
relationship begins. The principal can authenticate the agent's behaviour; however, the optimal 
decision which is the cost of this decision relies on the agent's type (which is considered to be 
private information related to the agent). Although the principal can be aware that the agent can 
be one of several possible types, they cannot identify the exact type without access to the agent 
(Loben, 2009). Moral hazard and adverse selection problems often do not exist in isolation (Yang 
and Yang, 2010). This is normally a result of the existence of synergies between stages of the 
venture, accounting for why different tasks are bundled in a distinct activity and delegated to a 
sole responsible agent firm (Biong, 2013). The effort that the agent firm exerts at the construction 
stage influences the circumstances it encounters at the operation stage. For example, exercising 
effort might enhance the chance of meeting a high demand for the service (as the infrastructure is 
more dependable) or, a reduced price of production (as the cost is an internal attribute of the 
project). As such, provision of effort by the agent is advantageous (Blanc-Brude, 2013). 
 
Within extant literature, moral hazard and adverse selection research frontiers have been expanded 
and propagated by various authors (Monteiro, 2010; Wuyts et al., 2009; Blombäck and Axelsson, 
2007). Biong (2013) investigated reputation and pricing effects on choosing subcontractors in 
asymmetric markets while, Monteiro (2009) explored risk management in agency relationships. 
According to Monteiro (2009), in the project’s bidding phase, the tenderer does not know precisely 
the bidder's technical strength, level of management, service quality among others. The bidder is 
similarly unclear of the tender’s financial capacity and business reputation. This can create both 
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moral hazard and adverse selection problems. However, most authors examined moral hazard and 
adverse selection concentrating on procurement systems, supply chain management, outsourcing, 
and make-or-buy decisions (Ive and Chang, 2007; Yiu et al., 2002; Tedelis, 2002). For instance, 
Corvellec and Macheridis (2010) conducted a study on the impact of adverse selection on building 
performance and quality. Unsal and Taylor (2010) investigated sub-contracting problems 
associated with information asymmetry while Ceric (2010) investigated the role of moral hazard 
and adverse selection on procurement systems. This research goes further by identifying the causes 
and effects relationship between moral hazard and adverse selection on Ghanaian PPP construction 
projects. The research findings will serve as a guide for construction stakeholders in the PPP sector 
on the causes and effects of adverse selection and moral hazard, and how to mitigate these.  
 
EXPLORING AGENCY THEORY IN PPP CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS: 
The Principal-Agent problem is the situation in a contract where one of the parties involved in the 
contarct is better informed than the other party (Jäger, 2008). In PPP construction projects, 
normally, the government and a private sector firm(s) have a principal and agent relationship 
(Turner and Müller, 2004). The principal-agent relationship establishes a delegation of tasks 
between the principal and the agent where the principal depends on the agent to undertake a task 
on their behalf (Müller and Turner, 2005). Hence, it is assumed that an agent will try to maximise 
their benefit even when that may involve a higher damage to the client (Schieg, 2008). According 
to the Principal-Agent theory, this problem is characterised by the issues concerning the 
relationship between the principal and the agent, which might include adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Ceric, 2010; Ceric, 2003). 
 
According to the Project Management Institute (2000), the project owner is a person or the group 
of people responsible for providing financial resources for the delivery and completion of the 
project (Project Management Institute, 2000). Ideally, in a PPP setting, the public sector engages 
the private sector to undertake activities required to finish the project. According to the Principal-
Agent theory, the relationship between the two parties also involves self-interest of each party 
(Schieg, 2008). When one of the two parties is better informed than the other, it is characterised 
by information asymmetry. Information asymmetries exist whenever the agent and principal do 
not possess the same level of information at the same time. The stakeholders in a PPP construction 
project are expected to work together to meet the goals of time, quality and cost. However, due to 
self-interest, they may not share all the information accrued. This normally leads to two different 
types of information asymmetries, namely: hidden characteristics and hidden information (Winch, 
2010). 
 
Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard should not pose a challenge or problem when both the principal and agent share the 
same objective when conducting all the project required functions. Any misunderstanding related 
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to which action(s) should be taken and at what time normally create the basis for agency costs 
(Loben, 2009). A moral hazard problem can be one of two potential cases, namely: 
 
Case One:- The parties possess similar information at the time during which the relationship is 
established. Informational asymmetry arises immediately after signing the contract as the principal 
cannot verify and observe the efforts and actions of the agent, or in some cases, the principal cannot 
flawlessly control such efforts and actions. In modelling this condition, the assumption is made 
that the agent's effort post contract signature, is not confirmable and accordingly, this variable 
cannot be plainly added to the contract stipulations/ clauses.  
 
Case Two:- Some moral hazard problems are attributed to informational asymmetries that occur 
before accomplishing the contract efforts - particularly, when the agent monitors the product of 
the environment's decision but the principal does not. Once the contract is signed, the uncertainty 
is identical for both the principal and agent, but before starting the contract action(s), the agent 
will have an informational benefit by observing an appropriate variable (Loben, 2009). Within this 
regard, this second type of moral hazard challenge is much less represented in extant literature. 
According to Chiocha (2009), in Malawi, a number of building project inspectors indulged in 
collusion as a result of moral hazard thereby bringing the concept of monitoring into disrepute.  
  
Adverse Selection 
An adverse selection problem occurs when the agent holds private information before the 
relationship begins. The principal can authenticate the agent's behavior - however, the cost of 
obtaining the optimal decision relies upon the agent’s type which is private information 
considering the agent. Although the principal might be aware that the agent can be one of several 
possible types, the principal cannot identify such types without having access to the agent full 
details (Loben, 2009). In disparity to the moral hazard problem where the uncertainty is exogenous, 
in this instance, the uncertainty is exogenous to the principal. The adverse selection challenge 
exists not only when the agent's informal actions relate to their own private features, but also when 
there is asymmetric information relating to any variable relevant to the contracted partnership. A 
typical example is of a public agency which contracts a private firm for the building of a hospital 
while lacking knowledge concerning the most current technological innovations, regarding the 
building of hospitals (Loben, 2009). A study by Ameyaw et al. (2011) in Ghana showed that due 
to adverse selection, there has been corruption in project procurement right from project inception 
to completion 
 
 
CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION OF PPP 
PROJECTS:  
One of the main causes of information asymmetry problem is that effort dimensions are not 
verifiable as a significant cause. The extent of effort exerted in work cannot be specified in the 
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contracts hence leading to problems – the agent then has the incentive to minimise effort when 
undertaking work to maximise profit (Guasch, 2004). Low transfer of risks causes moral hazard 
and adverse selection. (Boukendour, 2007). Inexperience as a cause occurs when inexperienced 
contractors bid for PPP projects and withhold vital information from the principal before the 
relationship begins (Allen, 2003).  
 
Another major cause of moral hazard and adverse selection of PPP construction projects is low 
incentives. When the risks and liability of cost overruns are not tolerated by the party constructing, 
low incentive mentality to control costs prevails (Blanc-Brude, 2013). In renegotiation of 
contracts, renegotiation incidents being persistent in PPPs lead to agency problems (Guasch et al., 
2008). There have been calls for laws that prevent renegotiation of contracts in PPPs by some 
procurement models, but many of these models cannot be adapted by modern contracts (Laffont 
2003). 
Lack of accurate information about project conditions is another cause of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Due to the long-term scope of PPP projects, accurate information on the existing, future 
and indirect costs of the works are obscured. This increases the prevalence of moral hazard and 
adverse selection (Blanc-Brude, 2013; and Loben, 2009). Limited ability to commit to contractual 
obligations is also a cause and is referred to as conditions of restricted commitment (Iossa and 
Martimort, 2008). In these instances, contractual parties are unable to abide by their obligations 
spelt out in the contract (Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2008).  Choosing the wrong party to execute 
the work leads to moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Adverse selection results when the 
contractor selects the wrong party (agent), to begin with. This leads to moral hazard problems of 
cost overruns and poor risk management (Loben, 2009).  
 
Siphoning of funds is a significant effect arising from moral hazard and adverse selection. The 
agent of the contract may syphon funds, and this works against the principal hence, instead of 
focusing on work that drives success, the agent can divert monies for private consumption and 
remaining funds to create the impression of productivity (Chong et al., 2007). Information 
asymmetry stimulates opportunistic behaviour which is an effect of moral hazard and adverse 
selection (Schieg, 2008). In the project’s bidding phase, the tenderer does not know clearly the 
bidder's technical strength and the bidder is also unclear of the tender’s financial ability (Martimort 
and Straub, 2008). Consequences on profitability is another effect. Private investment becomes 
difficult to attract especially when projects are large and private sponsors are averse to risk (Iossa 
and Martimort, 2008). Moral hazard leads to negative implications for the enforceability of the 
contract (Chong et al., 2007).  
 
Reduction of competition occurs because of moral hazard and adverse selection. When bidders 
develop an innovative offer, they risk losing the tender and not being repaid for the innovation 
(Badenfelt, 2008). This limits the number of bidders and successively failed bids erode competition 
as the opportunity to win a contract is outweighed by the cost of lost bids (Boukendour, 2007). 
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Corruption is also an effect of moral hazard and adverse selection. The construction industry 
worldwide has a negative reputation for bribery and corruption incidents (Sohail and Cavill, 2008). 
Martimort and Straub (2008) suggest that countries with multi-level systems of government are 
more exposed to corruption. Consequently, dishonesty is a widespread effect of adverse selection 
and moral hazard and asymmetric information can engender dishonesty to create a major project 
risk in construction (Martimort and Straub, 2008). In addition, high transaction costs are a 
consequence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Transaction costs arise because the 
government negotiates with and monitors the private sector partners who have their interests and 
agendas (Muhwezi et al., 2014).  Figure I below illustrates the conceptual framework for the study. 
 
<Insert Figure I about Here> 
 
METHODOLOGY 
A questionnaire survey was used as the main instrument to collect research required data. Both 
primary and secondary quantitative data were utilized, and structural equation modeling (SEM) 
was the primary analytical tool for developing the research framework (Tong, 2007). Sample size 
has an important effect on model fit in SEM analysis and model testing. Tong (ibid) stressed that 
small sample size leads to more bias in model fit and makes the model ineffective. According to 
El-Gohary and El-Gohary (2016); El-Gohary (2014); El-Gohary (2012), a sample size of 100 is 
considered small leading to undesirable results in SEM; a fact also noted by El-Gohary (2009) and 
Iacobucci (2010). For optimal SEM analysis, a sample size of 200 or more with a specific number 
of variables is ideal for a good fit model analysis (Curran et al., 2004). The questionnaire 
comprised questions primarily closed-ended and scaled-response type.  Respondents were asked 
to rank on a scale of 1-5 the relationship between effects and causes of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. The causes and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection were coded in the 
questionnaire and this was used in SEM analysis (refer to Tables I and II) 
 
A purposive sampling technique was adopted which consisted identifying professionals involved 
in Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) construction projects. Purposive sampling is very useful for 
instances where the researcher needs to contact a targeted sample fast (Tongco, 2007). 
Furthermore, snowball-sampling technique was also used to secure an adequate sample size given 
the different challenges encountered in evaluating the population size (Creswell, 2005). This 
mixed-sampling process continued until a representative sample size of fifty-six (56) government 
agencies, consultancy firms and construction companies in charge of Public Private Partnership 
projects was obtained in Ghana. Questionnaires were distributed in the cities of Accra and Kumasi 
to five (5) respondents in each one of these companies and/ or agencies resulting in a total of two 
hundred and eighty (280) potential respondents. Two hundred and ten (210) useable questionnaires 
representing seventy-five percent (75%) response rate were attained back. 
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The SEM tool was adopted as the best tool for developing the structural model. According to Kline 
(2010), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and exploratory factor analysis (EFA) exist as the most 
useful approaches in analysing SEM variables (Bentler, 2005). The purpose of EFA is to explore 
the probable fundamental factor structure in a set of observed variables (Byrne, 2006). CFA 
conversely confirms already recognised factor structure of a set of observed variables (Hair et al., 
2013). For this study, CFA was the best in analysing the constructs in the model and the causal 
relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. CFA was undertaken on the 
exogenous variables to define its best fit for the model.  The main approaches used in SEM to 
suitably develop models are score reliability and validity, covariance analysis, z-tests, the test of 
significance and measure of goodness of fit of the model. Data retrieved from fieldwork was 
carefully reviewed then inputted into SPSS, and later extrapolated into STATA and AMOS for 
further analysis. P-values were used to explain the statistical significance. This was done by 
convention and further compared to past studies such as Kwofie et al. (2014). The p-value was set 
at 0.05 and infers a ninety-five percent chance that the population mean is within a stated range of 
values. As recommended by Hair et al. (2014) and Eid and El-Gohary (2013), this research adopted 
multi approaches to assess model fit. Practically, the standardised root mean square residual 
(SRMR), goodness of fit index (GFI), bentler comparative fit index (CFI), chi-square (χ2), satorra-
bentler scaled chi-square (S – Bχ2), root mean square error of approximation (with its 90% or 95% 
confidence interval) and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) which deliver the 
essential signs of how best the theory fits the data (Hair et al., 2014). A mixture of 
incremental/comparative fit indices and absolute fit index is however recommended for SEM 
analysis. 
 
Fit indexes of CFI, χ2, GFI and S – Bχ2 are under the incremental/ comparative fit indices and 
RMSEA and SRMR instead, are under the absolute fit indices (Kline, 2010). The RMSEA and 
SRMR further define how best a model fits the data and indicates if proposed model is the best fit 
or not (McDonald and Ho, 2002). This research utilised three indices, namely: CFI, RMSEA and 
GFI. This was done to achieve a robust standard to assess the model fit. The χ2 was chosen to 
evaluate the acceptance of the mode generated. By convention, GFI result nearer to 0.95 or greater 
than 0.90 is appropriate for model test of fit (Kline, 2010). According to Wong (2011), the 
satisfactory or acceptable cut-off benchmarks of fit statistics are: CFI = value should be ≥ 0.95 for 
good fit and 0.90 for acceptable fit; chi-square (χ2) ratio to df ≤ 3 or5 with an insignificant or 
significant p value (p > 0.05); SRMR = value should be ≤ 0.05 as good fit and ≤ 0.08 for acceptable 
fit (value of 0.1 is also acceptable); RMSEA = value should be < 0.05 for good fit (values < and 
0.08 indicate a reasonable and acceptable error of approximation and values of > 0.10 suggests a 
poor fit), and finally, RMSEA at 90% CI = values to be < 0.05 to 0.08 with confidence interval. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION: 
Under the SEM technique, models which will be estimated are normally represented in graphical 
diagrams. These diagrams indicate the assumed relationship(s) between the variables by linking 
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arrows among the independent and dependent variables. It is recommended that a very stable 
identified model must indicate a positive degree of freedom for the parameters in the over-
identified model (Lei and Wu, 2008). In this study, a preliminary analysis by way of CFA produced 
values of 2 and 14 as minimum and maximum degrees of freedom respectively. This proves a very 
suitable positive value of the degree of freedom. It is inferred that this model can be estimated. 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of Unobserved Constructs: 
CFA is a statistical method that verifies factor structure of a set of observed variables. It is normally 
used in the measurement of SEM models. The assessment of independent and dependent variables 
as being enough indicators is crucial in evaluating measurement invariance (MI). CFA should 
firstly be done on every latent variable by evaluating the coefficients and confirming the factor 
structure of every variable. This is to prevent any possible MI which may affect the good-fit of the 
model. If the fit of each model is good and the item loading is adequate, it is assumed that the 
indicators of the factors are fitting. The causes and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection 
were coded for SEM analysis (refer to Tables I and II). 
 
<Insert Tables I and II about Here> 
 
Analysis of Low incentives to control costs:  
Low incentives to control costs was analysed using the responses obtained from the data collection 
process and CFA on nine (9) variables in the construct. There is a need to analytically evaluate all 
the variables to settle on the ones in the model, which succinctly measure and explain a construct 
(Bentler, 2005; Wong, 2010). Usually, correlations, standard errors and standardised residual 
covariance are important guidelines in choosing the most acceptable variables which must be in 
the construct for further analysis (Field, 2009). From Table IIIa and b, the variables C1A, C1E, 
C1F and C1G were excluded. The remaining five variables were subjected to detailed CFA tests. 
An accurate and robust SEM should have both fixed and free parameters to be estimated from the 
data (Bentler, 2005). Their significance, validity, model fit and parameter estimates were found.  
 
<Insert Tables III (a) and III (b) about Here> 
 
The model fit assessment must utilise multiple standards of both absolute and incremental fit 
indices to support the chi-square test. Although chi-square is a good measure of fit, it is affected 
by the sample size and hence, gives erroneous probability figures (Byrne, 2006). Consequently, 
the satorra-bentler scaled chi-square (S – Bχ2) was used as it provides a much better fit (Iacobucci, 
2010). From Table III (a) and (b), the CFI and GFI values were 0.951 and 0.983 correspondingly. 
Bentler (2005) suggests that CFI values above 0.90 provide a good fit whereas, GFI test values of 
0.90 and above also provide a good fit (Lei and Wu, 2008). The RMSEA value was 0.065 and 
illustrates that a good fit was obtained (c.f. Bentler, 2005; Lei and Wu, 2008). Sample data on low 
incentives to control cost measurement model produced S – Bχ2 to be 9.481 with a degree of 
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freedom (df) equal 5 while the sig. value (p-value) was 0.091. The overall goodness of fit is 
revealed by the magnitude of discrepancy amongst the sample covariance matrix and the 
covariance matrix (population) inferred by the model such that the good model fit must possess df 
value ˃ 0 and sig. values (p values) ˃ 0.05.  
 
A p-value ˃ 0.05 related to S – Bχ2 shows that the difference between the sample data and low 
incentives to control cost measurement model is insignificant and hence, the model fits the data 
(Kline, 2010). According to Hair et al., (2014) and Kaplan (2009), Z-values (critical ratios) and 
coefficient of determination (R2) figures are important in explaining the significance and effects 
of the different parameters within a model. Correlation values and standard errors showed that all 
the coefficient values were less than 1.00. Z statistics had a positive value higher than 1.96 and 
therefore deemed to be very suitable. The Z test statistics showed the significance or otherwise of 
the path coefficients of the model. As indicated by Kline (2010), utilising a two-tailed Z-test with 
a significance level of 0.05, path coefficient is significant if Z statistics exceeds 1.96. All Z-values 
resulted from the data analysis exceeded 1.96 and therefore implies that the indicator variables 
loadings are very significant. R2, which is the coefficient of determination, measures the predictive 
accuracy of the model. The effect of measurement of R2 spans between 0 and 1. The value 1 
signifies perfect accuracy of prediction (Hair et al., 2014). A value of 0.75 or greater is seen as 
substantial, 0.50 is moderate while 0.25 or lesser signifies reflects weak accuracy of prediction 
(Henseler et al., 2010).  From the results of CFA analysis, the robust fit indices met the prescribed 
cut-off criteria and hence the model sufficiently fits the data. All parameters estimates were found 
to be both statistically significant and viable. 
 
Analysis of the Wrong Party Chosen to Execute Project  
A preliminary CFA analysis was conducted to identify the variables to be added in the CFA 
analysis to evaluate model fitting and the variables C2F and C2G were excluded. The remaining 
seven variables were subject to detailed CFA tests. This analysis detected the importance of the 
indicator variables to the factor, the significance of variables, factor structure, parameter estimation 
and model fit. 
 
<Insert Tables IV (a) and IV (b) about Here> 
 
From Tables IV (a) and (b), S – Bχ2 value was 28.269 with 14 degrees of freedom (df), a p-value 
of 0.013, the CFI value was 0.787 and the GFI value was 0.963. This is found to be close to the 
standard cut-off value of x≥0.90 (acceptable) and x≥0.95 (good fit). It can, therefore, be observed 
to be a good fit. Furthermore, the RMSEA value was 0.07, which is acceptable since the cut-off 
values are x≤0.080 (acceptable) and x≤0.05 (good fit) (Kline, 2010). In addition, the Z-statistic 
figures were above 1.96 and the resultant significant test figures below 0.05 (p<0.05). These 
statistics proves that the research results are both statistically significant and acceptable. In 
conclusion, the robust fit indices met the prescribed cut-off points, and the model fits the data. 
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Analysis of Low Transfer of Risk  
This construct was explained by nine indicator variables (effects). The variables C3F, C3H and 
C3I were excluded after conducting the CFA. The remaining six variables were subject to detailed 
CFA tests (refer to Tables V (a) and (b).  
 
<Insert Tables V (a) and V (b) About Here> 
 
Low transfer of risk factor model had an S – Bχ2 figure of 16.395 with 9 degrees of freedom and a 
corresponding p-value was 0.059. Chi-square figure above 0.05 (p>0.05) which implies that the 
difference between the hypothesised low transfer of risk factor model and the sample data is not 
significant and indicates that the data fits the model well. It reveals that there is no inconsistency 
among the sample and population (Kline, 2010). The robust CFI and GFI indices were 0.951 and 
0.974 correspondingly. The RMSEA value was 0.063, which is deemed acceptable.  As such, it is 
concluded that this model sufficiently fits the data and therefore has a good fit. From Tables Va 
and b, the standard errors were all below 1.00 and were therefore acceptable. The Z values were 
all above the standard value of 1.96 based on the probability level of 0.05. All the p-values were 
below 0.05. This proves that the variables were genuinely statistically significant to the factor. The 
R2 values had moderate and weak levels of predictive accuracy. In summary, the robust fit indices 
satisfied the cut-off benchmarks. Therefore, low transfer of risk factor model has acceptable fit to 
the sample data. 
 
Analysis of Lack of Accurate Information about Project Condition:  
After preliminary CFA tests, variables C4A, C4B, C4D and C4F were excluded. Hence, they did 
not form part of the detailed CFA analysis. The sample data on this model gave an S – Bχ2 value 
of 8.94 with 5 degrees of freedom and the p-value for the sample size of 210 is 0.111. Since chi-
square value is greater than 0.05, it implies that the difference between the sample data and the 
hypothesised lack of accurate information about project condition factor is not significant. The fit 
function is good and well-specified leading to the model being retained (refer to Tables VI (a) and 
(b).  
 
<Insert Tables VI (a) and VI (b) about Here> 
 
 
The robust CFI and GFI indices were 0.885 and 0.984 respectively. The GFI is very near to the 
upper limit of 1.00 and therefore illustrates a good fit. According to Iacobucci (2010), a model is 
a good fit if its CFI or GFI is more than the cut-off figure of 0.95. The RMSEA value is 0.061, 
which is acceptable. From Tables Via and b, all the standard errors were below 1.00 and therefore 
adequate and reasonable. The Z values were all above the standard value of 1.96 based on the 
probability level of 0.05. Four of the p-values were below 0.05. This proves that many of the 
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variables were genuinely statistically significant to the factor. The parameter estimates indicated 
satisfactory linkages with the factor construct. The R2 values had moderate and weak levels of 
predictive accuracy. This indicates a good fitting model for lack of accurate information about 
project condition factor.  
 
Analysis of Effort Dimensions which are not Verifiable:  
The effort dimensions, which are not verifiable factor, was defined by nine variables. After 
preliminary CFA tests were conducted, three variables were excluded, namely C5B, C4F and C4H. 
The remaining six variables were subject to detailed CFA tests and analysis (refer to Tables VII 
(a) and VII (b).  
 
<Insert Tables VII (a) and VII(b) about Here> 
 
 
In assessing the goodness of fit, the sample data for effort dimensions, which are not verifiable 
factor, generated an S– Bχ2 value of 19.407 with 9 degrees of freedom and complementary 
probability of 0.022. Additionally, the robust CFI and GFI were 0.803 and 0.97 respectively. The 
robust RMSEA figure of 0.074 is acceptable conventionally and therefore a clear indication of 
good fit of model to sample. In an ideal situation, a model that fits should have parameter estimates 
of significance especially the Z test to help in knowing if the structure factor is feasible. From 
Tables VIIa and b, the values were above the standard of 1.96. The associated p-values were all 
below 0.05 except for one variable. The R2 values had moderate and weak levels of predictive 
accuracy. In summary, the robust fit indices were good fit and the parameter estimates were 
feasible and significant statistically. 
 
Analysis of Regeneration of Contracts  
The regeneration of contracts factor was defined by nine variables. After preliminary CFA tests 
were conducted, five variables were excluded, namely C6B, C6C, C6D, C6E and C6F. The 
remaining four variables were subject to detailed CFA tests and analysis. To know how best the 
model fits the factor and variables, tests were conducted for the statistical significance at 
probability level of 0.05, fit statistics and standardised residual covariance distribution matrix 
(refer to Tables VIII (a) and (b).  
 
<Insert Tables VIII (a) and VIII (b) about Here> 
 
In assessing the goodness of fit, the sample data for regeneration of contracts factor generated an 
S–Bχ2 value of 1.917 with 2 degrees of freedom and probability of 0.384. Furthermore, the robust 
CFI and GFI were 1.000 and 0.995 correspondingly. The robust RMSEA figure of 0.074 is 
acceptable standardly and therefore provide an unconditional indication of good fit of the model 
to the research sample. In an ideal situation, a model that fits should have parameter estimates of 
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significance especially the Z test to help in knowing if the structure factor is feasible. The values 
were above the conventional value of 1.96. The associated p-values were all 0.00, which is below 
0.05. The R2 values had strong and weak levels of predictive accuracy. The robust fit indices are 
therefore showing a good fit, and the parameter estimates are feasible and statistically significant. 
 
Analysis of Limited Ability to Commit to Contractual Obligations:  
The limited ability to commit to contractual obligations factor was defined by nine variables. After 
preliminary CFA tests were conducted, five variables were excluded, namely C7A, C7C, C7D, 
C7H and C7I. Their significance, validity, model fit and parameter estimates were found to be 
good (refer to Tables IX (a) and (b).  
 
<Insert Tables IX (a) and IX (b) about Here> 
 
 
The robust CFI and GFI indices were 0.935 and 0.989 respectively. The CFI and GFI are very near 
to the upper limit of 1.00 and therefore show an indication of a good fit. According to Iacobucci 
(2010), a model is a good fit if its CFI or GFI is more than the cut-off figure of 0.95. The RMSEA 
value is 0.082, which is acceptable. All the standard errors were below 1.00 and hence adequate 
and reasonable. The Z values except one were all above the standard value of 1.96 based on the 
probability level of 0.05. Four of the p-values were below 0.05. This proves that many of the 
variables were genuinely statistically significant to the factor. The parameter estimates indicated 
satisfactory linkages with the factor construct. The R2 values had a mixture of strong and weak 
levels of predictive accuracy. This indicates a good fitting model for limited ability to commit to 
contractual obligations factor. 
 
Analysis of Inexperience:  
Analysis of Inexperience construct was explained by nine indicator variables (effects). After 
conducting the preliminary CFA analysis, two (2) variables were excluded, namely C8E and C8H. 
Inexperience factor was analysed with all the 210 responses obtained from the research survey. 
Tests were conducted for the statistical significance at probability level of five percent, fit statistics 
and standardised residual covariance distribution matrix (refer to Tables X (a) and (b).  
 
<Insert Tables X (a) and X (b) about Here> 
 
 
S – Bχ2 value was 18.714 with 14 degrees of freedom (df) and a p-value of 0.176. The CFI value 
was 0.955 and GFI value was 0.977. This is close to the standard cut-off value of x≥0.90 
(acceptable) and x≥0.95 (good fit). As such, it is observed to be good fit. Furthermore, the RMSEA 
value was 0.00, which is good fit since the cut-off values are x≤0.080 (acceptable) and x≤0.05 
(good fit) (Kline, 2010). The Z-statistic figures except one were above 1.96 and the resultant 
13 
 
significant test figures below 0.05 (p<0.05). This proves results are statistically significant and 
acceptable. Accordingly, it can be construed from results of the CFA analysis that, robust fit 
indices met the prescribed cut-off points and the model fits the data. The parameter estimates were 
also statistically significant. 
 
Summary of Measurement Model 
Table XI and Figure II below summarise the relationships between causes and effects of moral 
hazard and adverse selection of PPP construction projects. 
 
<Insert Table XI about Here> 
<Insert Figure II about Here> 
 
Discussion 
Siphoning of funds arises due to moral hazard and adverse selection. The agent could siphon funds 
and this works against the principal hence, instead of focusing on work that drives success, the 
agent can divert monies for private consumption and remaining funds to create the impression of 
productivity. Monitoring this situation brings about three challenges (Chong et al., 2007). First, 
firms may attempt to win the contract with limited effort and with the premeditated intention of 
siphoning all funds. Second, a firm which has worked efficiently according to contract may start 
siphoning funds whilst waiting to exercise the option of revealing success at a future more 
convenient date. Third, towards the end of contract, a firm may cease exerting effort and start 
siphoning funds, because the probability of success fails to justify the exertion of more effort. For 
instance, a construction company may succeed at the end of a large project and then delay 
completion of the less demanding activities over time to stretch out payments received from the 
principal (Chong et al., 2007). Consequences on profitability is another effect. Because of the 
inherent challenges involved in producing accurate estimates, the firm’s profits are largely 
uncertain before the operation phase starts (Chong et al., 2007). Private investment becomes 
difficult to attract especially when projects are large and private sponsors are averse to risk (Iossa 
and Martimort, 2008). In Europe, cross border infrastructure has received little concern from 
private financiers. Even when private investors turn up, they tend to behave opportunistically 
leading to moral hazard (Chong et al., 2007). 
 
CONCLUSION  
The research identified the causes and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection on PPP 
construction projects. Research findings have contributed to past studies and existing knowledge 
on PPP and information asymmetry, and have shed much needed light onto moral hazard and 
adverse selection. SEM was used to explore the causal relationships between the causes and effects 
of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects. Causes being the 
independent variables (IV) and effects the dependent variables (DV). The measured model was 
used to predict, estimate and depict the complex causal relationships (i.e. the directionality). It 
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further showed the degree of association and isolation of the unobserved variables on the indicator 
factors. CFA was used to evaluate the fit of items to latent constructs. Since the fit of each model 
was good and the item loadings were adequate, it was assumed that the indicators of the factors 
were fitting. The diagnostic fit analysis was conducted using robust maximum likelihood to test 
statistical significance of parameter estimates and the results indicated a good fit. The majority of 
previous studies had assessed the causal relationships between different variables using univariate 
statistical tools like MANOVA, ANOVA or multiple regression modelling to produce models. Yet 
these models are unable to adequately illustrate the complete relationships among the dependent 
variables and independent variables because they condense and relate several independent 
variables into one dependent variable. In this research, SEM was utilized because it provides a 
better approach in investigating the causal relationships in a model and the direction of influence 
within it. Moreover, it can be concluded that this study is one of the first studies using SEM to 
investigate causal and effects relationships of moral hazard and adverse selection on PPP 
construction projects. However, the model developed was not validated and so consequently, 
future studies are required to: validate the model developed; and expand the relevance of the model 
to other national and industry settings. Execution of PPP projects in African countries still remains a 
significant challenge and is mainly due to information asymmetry. The research findings will serve 
as a guide for construction stakeholders in the PPP sector on the causes and effects of adverse 
selection and moral hazard, and how to mitigate these. Moral hazard and adverse selection are 
serious problems bedeviling the construction industries of developing countries including Ghana. 
Hence, it is essential to introduce the use of incentives and monitoring mechanism into project 
contracts. This will go a long way to reduce information asymmetry.   
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Figure I - Conceptual Framework for Causes and Effects of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 
of Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Construction Projects 
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Table I - Coding of Causes for SEM Analysis 
CAUSES Code 
Low incentives to control costs  C1 
Wrong party chosen to execute project  C2 
Low transfer of risk  C3 
Lack of accurate information about project conditions C4 
Effort dimensions which are not verifiable  C5 
Renegotiation of contracts C6 
Limited ability to commit to contractual obligations C7 
Inexperience C8 
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Table II - Coding of Effects for SEM Analysis 
EFFECTS Code 
Cost overruns on budget  A 
High transaction costs B 
Reduction of competition  C 
Consequences on profitability of project  D 
Negative implications on enforceability of contract E 
Corruption F 
Dishonesty G 
Opportunistic behavior H 
Siphoning of funds I 
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Table III (a) - Constructs and Final Items: Low Incentives to Control Costs 
Variables 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Std. Err 
C.R/ 
Z-Value 
R-
Square 
Sig-
Value 
C1B: High transaction costs 0.463 0.079 5.880 0.214 0.000 
C1C: Reduction of 
competition 
0.660 0.077 8.570 0.436 0.000 
C1D: Consequences on 
profitability of project 
0.504 0.076 6.650 0.254 0.000 
C1H: Opportunistic 
behaviour  
0.458 0.080 5.760 0.210 0.000 
C1I: Siphoning of funds 0.330 0.082 4.010 0.109 0.000 
 
 
Table III (b) - Robust Fit Index: Low Incentives to Control Costs 
Fit Index Cut-Off Value Estimate Remark 
S-B𝜒2  9.481 
Good Fit Df  5 
Sig. Value x > 0.05 0.091 
CFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.951 Good Fit 
GFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.983 Good Fit 
RMSEA 
x ≤ 0.08 (Acceptable), 
x ≤ 0.05 (Good Fit) 
0.065 Acceptable 
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Table IV (a)- Constructs and Final Items: Wrong Party Chosen to Execute Project 
Variables 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Std. Err 
C.R/ 
Z-Value 
R-
Square 
Sig-
Value 
C2A: Cost overruns on budget 0.403 0.094 4.280 0.163 0.000 
C2B: High transaction costs 0.527 0.099 5.340 0.278 0.000 
C2C: Reduction of 
competition 
0.434 0.094 4.620 0.189 0.000 
C2D: Consequences on      
profitability of project 
0.311 0.102 3.050 0.097 0.002 
C2E: Negative implications on 
enforceability of contract 
0.203 0.097 2.080 0.041 0.037 
C2H: Opportunistic behaviour 0.360 0.090 4.010 0.130 0.000 
C2I: Siphoning of funds 0.268 0.096 2.800 0.072 0.005 
 
Table IV (b) - Robust Fit Index: Wrong Party Chosen to Execute Project 
Fit Index Cut-Off Value Estimate Remark 
S-B𝜒2  28.269 
 Df  14 
Sig. Value x > 0.05 0.013 
CFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.787   
GFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.963 Good Fit 
RMSEA 
x ≤ 0.08 (Acceptable), 
x ≤ 0.05 (Good Fit) 
0.07 Acceptable 
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Table V (a) - Constructs and Final Items: Low Transfer of Risk 
Variables 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Std. Err 
C.R/ 
Z-Value 
R-Square 
Sig-
Value 
C3A: Cost overruns on 
budget 
0.387 0.074 5.230 0.150 0.000 
C3B: High transaction costs 0.518 0.071 7.310 0.268 0.000 
C3C: Reduction of 
competition 
0.614 0.064 9.580 0.378 0.000 
C3D: Consequences on 
profitability of project 
0.500 0.070 7.130 0.250 0.000 
C3E: Negative implications 
on enforceability of contract 
0.646 0.065 9.940 0.417 0.000 
C3G: Dishonesty 0.382 0.074 5.170 0.146 0.000 
 
Table V (b) - Robust Fit Index: Low Transfer of Risk 
Fit Index Cut-Off Value Estimate Remark 
S-B𝜒2  16.395 
Acceptable Df  9 
Sig x > 0.05 0.059 
CFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.951 Good Fit 
GFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.974 Good Fit 
RMSEA 
x ≤ 0.08 (Acceptable), 
x ≤ 0.05 (Good Fit) 
0.063 Acceptable 
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Table VI (a) - Constructs and Final Items: Lack of Accurate Information about Project 
Condition 
Variables 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Std. 
Err 
C.R/ 
Z-Value 
R-
Square 
Sig-
Value 
C4C: Reduction of competition 0.198 0.120 1.660 0.039 0.097 
C4E: Negative implications on 
enforceability of contract 
0.403 0.122 3.300 0.162 0.001 
C4G: Dishonesty 0.794 0.230 3.450 0.630 0.001 
C4H: Opportunistic behaviour  0.229 0.088 2.590 0.052 0.010 
C4I: Siphoning of funds -0.011 0.085 -0.120 0.000 0.901 
 
 
Table VI (b) - Robust Fit Index: Lack of Accurate Information about Project Condition 
Fit Index Cut-Off Value Estimate Remark 
S-B𝜒2  8.94 
Good Fit Df  5 
Sig x > 0.05 0.111 
CFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.885   
GFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.984 Good Fit 
RMSEA 
x ≤ 0.08 (Acceptable), 
x ≤ 0.05 (Good Fit) 
0.061 Acceptable 
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Table VII (a) - Constructs and Final Items: Effort Dimensions which are not Verifiable 
Variables 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Std. Err 
C.R/ 
Z-Value 
R-Square 
Sig-
Value 
C5A: Cost overruns on budget 0.181 0.090 2.020 0.033 0.044 
C5C: Reduction of competition 0.391 0.098 4.000 0.153 0.000 
C5D: Consequences on 
profitability of project 
0.817 0.159 5.150 0.668 0.000 
C5E: Negative implications on 
enforceability of contract 
0.292 0.090 3.230 0.085 0.001 
C5G: Dishonesty -0.200 0.081 -2.480 0.040 0.013 
C5I: Siphoning of funds 0.130 0.084 1.540 0.017 0.124 
 
 
Table VII (b) - Robust Fit Index: Effort Dimensions which are not Verifiable 
Fit Index Cut-Off Value Estimate Remark 
S-B𝜒2  19.407 
  Df  9 
Sig x > 0.05 0.022 
CFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.803   
GFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.97 Good Fit 
RMSEA 
x ≤ 0.08 (Acceptable), 
x ≤ 0.05 (Good Fit) 
0.074 Acceptable 
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Table VIII (a) - Constructs and Final Items: Regeneration of Contracts 
Variables 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Std. Err 
C.R/ 
Z-Value 
R-
Square 
Sig-
Value 
C6A: Cost overruns on 
budget 
0.428 0.077 5.550 0.183 0.000 
C6G: Dishonesty 0.384 0.077 5.000 0.148 0.000 
C6H: Opportunistic 
behaviour  
0.850 0.091 9.300 0.722 0.000 
C6I: Siphoning of funds 0.460 0.072 6.430 0.211 0.000 
 
 
Table VIII (b) - Robust Fit Index: Regeneration of Contracts 
Fit Index Cut-Off Value Estimate Remark 
S-B𝜒2  1.917 
Good Fit df  2 
Sig x > 0.05 0.384 
CFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
1.000 Good Fit 
GFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.995 Good Fit 
RMSEA 
x ≤ 0.08 (Acceptable), 
x ≤ 0.05 (Good Fit) 
0.000 Good Fit 
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Table IX (a) - Constructs and Final Items: Limited Ability to Commit to Contractual Obligations 
Variables 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Std. Err 
C.R/ 
Z-Value 
R-
Square 
Sig-
Value 
C7B: High transaction costs 0.195 0.105 1.850 0.038 0.064 
C7E: Negative implications on 
enforceability of contract 
0.295 0.095 3.090 0.087 0.002 
C7F: Corruption 0.973 0.277 3.510 0.946 0.000 
C7G: Dishonesty 0.297 0.102 2.890 0.088 0.004 
 
 
Table IX (b) - Robust Fit Index: Limited Ability to Commit to Contractual Obligations 
Fit Index Cut-Off Value Estimate Remark 
S-B𝜒2  4.780 
Good Fit Df  2.000 
Sig x > 0.05 0.092 
CFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.935 Acceptable 
GFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.989 Good Fit 
RMSEA 
x ≤ 0.08 (Acceptable), 
x ≤ 0.05 (Good Fit) 
0.082 Acceptable 
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Table X (a) - Constructs and Final Items: Inexperience 
Variables 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Std. Err 
C.R/ 
Z-Value 
R-
Square 
Sig-
Value 
C8A: Cost overruns on budget 0.033 0.100 0.330 0.001 0.740 
C8B: High transaction costs 0.418 0.078 5.320 0.174 0.000 
C8C: Reduction of 
competition 
0.579 0.074 7.790 0.335 0.000 
C8D: Consequences on 
profitability of project 
0.598 0.073 8.220 0.357 0.000 
C8F: Corruption 0.434 0.080 5.440 0.188 0.000 
C8G: Dishonesty 0.450 0.077 5.810 0.202 0.000 
C8I: Siphoning of funds 0.278 0.082 3.410 0.077 0.001 
 
 
Table X (b) - Robust Fit Index: Inexperience 
Fit Index Cut-Off Value Estimate Remark 
S-B𝜒2  18.714 
Good Fit df  14.000 
Sig x > 0.05 0.176 
CFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.955 Acceptable 
GFI 
x ≥ 0.90 (Acceptable), 
x ≥ 0.95 (Good Fit) 
0.977 Good Fit 
RMSEA 
x ≤ 0.08 (Acceptable), 
x ≤ 0.05 (Good Fit) 
0.000 Good Fit 
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Table XI - Measurement Model: Relationship between Causes and Effects 
Variables Standardized Coefficient Std. Err 
C.R/ 
Z-Value 
R-Square Sig-Value 
Low Incentives to Control Costs 
C1B 0.463 0.079 5.880 0.214 0.000 
C1C 0.660 0.077 8.570 0.436 0.000 
C1D 0.504 0.076 6.650 0.254 0.000 
C1H 0.458 0.080 5.760 0.210 0.000 
C1I 0.330 0.082 4.010 0.109 0.000 
Wrong Party Chosen to Execute Project 
C2A 0.403 0.094 4.280 0.163 0.000 
C2B 0.527 0.099 5.340 0.278 0.000 
C2C 0.434 0.094 4.620 0.189 0.000 
C2D 0.311 0.102 3.050 0.097 0.002 
C2E 0.203 0.097 2.080 0.041 0.037 
C2H 0.360 0.090 4.010 0.130 0.000 
C2I 0.268 0.096 2.800 0.072 0.005 
Low Risk Transfer 
C3A 0.387 0.074 5.230 0.150 0.000 
C3B 0.518 0.071 7.310 0.268 0.000 
C3C 0.614 0.064 9.580 0.378 0.000 
C3D 0.500 0.070 7.130 0.250 0.000 
C3E 0.646 0.065 9.940 0.417 0.000 
C3G 0.382 0.074 5.170 0.146 0.000 
Lack of Accurate Information about Project Condition 
C4C 0.198 0.120 1.660 0.039 0.097 
C4E 0.403 0.122 3.300 0.162 0.001 
C4G 0.794 0.230 3.450 0.630 0.001 
C4H 0.229 0.088 2.590 0.052 0.010 
C4I -0.011 0.085 -0.120 0.000 0.901 
Effort Dimensions which are not Verifiable 
C5A 0.181 0.090 2.020 0.033 0.044 
C5C 0.391 0.098 4.000 0.153 0.000 
C5D 0.817 0.159 5.150 0.668 0.000 
C5E 0.292 0.090 3.230 0.085 0.001 
C5G -0.200 0.081 -2.480 0.040 0.013 
C5I 0.130 0.084 1.540 0.017 0.124 
34 
 
Regeneration of Contracts 
C6A 0.428 0.077 5.550 0.183 0.000 
C6G 0.384 0.077 5.000 0.148 0.000 
C6H 0.850 0.091 9.300 0.722 0.000 
C6I 0.460 0.072 6.430 0.211 0.000 
Limited Ability to Commit to Contractual Obligations 
C7B 0.195 0.105 1.850 0.038 0.064 
C7E 0.295 0.095 3.090 0.087 0.002 
C7F 0.973 0.277 3.510 0.946 0.000 
C7G 0.297 0.102 2.890 0.088 0.004 
Inexperience 
C8A 0.033 0.100 0.330 0.001 0.740 
C8B 0.418 0.078 5.320 0.174 0.000 
C8C 0.579 0.074 7.790 0.335 0.000 
C8D 0.598 0.073 8.220 0.357 0.000 
C8F 0.434 0.080 5.440 0.188 0.000 
C8G 0.450 0.077 5.810 0.202 0.000 
C8I 0.278 0.082 3.410 0.077 0.001 
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Figure II - Structural Equation Model 
 
